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ABSTRACT Privacy-preserving outsourcing algorithms for feature extraction not only reduce users’
storage and computation overhead but also preserve the image privacy. However, the existing schemes still
suffer from deficiencies induced by security, applications, efficiency and storage. To solve the problems,
we implement a consortium chain-based outsourcing feature extraction scheme over encrypted images
by using the smart contract, distributed autonomous corporation (DAC), sharding technique, and device
to device (D2D) communication, which is secure, widely applied, highly efficient, and has less storage
overhead. First, the effectiveness, security, and performance of our scheme are analyzed. Then, the efficiency
and storage overhead of our scheme are presented by conducting experimental results.
INDEX TERMS Outsourcing feature extraction, consortium chain, smart contract, DAC, sharding technique,
D2D communication.
I. INTRODUCTION
D2D (Device to Device) communication can meet the needs
for a variety of emerging business [1], such as advertising
push, information sharing and large event data sharing. The
advent of big data era has led to a surge in the number of
images, documents and videos [2], and data owners prefer to
outsource tasks [3], [4] for large-scale images feature extrac-
tion to the clouds because of limited local resources. How-
ever, simple feature extraction on image plaintext [5]–[8] will
no longer meet people’s needs due to the image information
leakage [9]. The conventional schemes [10]–[13] on plain-
text domain cannot assure the image privacy in the clouds.
Hence, feature extraction methods [14]–[17] on ciphertext
domain are proposed. A new approach in [18] designed a
multi-servers cloud structure with a tailored practical secu-
rity [19]–[21] to protect the image contents. Although var-
ious image feature detection tasks including the global and
local features can be performed, the approach still has poor
effectiveness (feature effects in terms of feature accuracy)
compared with SIFT [22]. To gain the same feature effects as
SIFT, a privacy-preserving implementation of homomorphic
encryption (SHE) based SIFT method [23] was proposed,
but this scheme incurs poor efficiency in terms of image
feature extraction and only resists pure ciphertext and known
plaintext attacks. To avoid the efficiency limitation caused by
SHE, SecSIFT (Securing SIFT) [24] allocated the computing
process of SIFT to a group of independent and coopera-
tive cloud servers, which achieves high efficiency. However,
these methods are either scarce of effectiveness, or worse
of security and efficiency. To preserve the image privacy
and feature accuracy in SIFT, and comply better security
and efficiency, Hu et al. [25] first designed two protocols for
secure multiplication (BSCP) and comparison (BSMP), then
developed a practical approach using the SHE integrated with
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FIGURE 1. Deficiencies in the existing methods, and our solutions.
the latest batching technique Single-Instruction Multi-Data
(SIMD). Unfortunately, the existing schemes still have some
drawbacks, such as unsafety, limited application ranges (e.g.
the clouds can only trade with a few of users), low efficiency
(e.g. only one image is handled by servers during the same
time) and large storage pressure as showed in FIGURE 1.
To the best of our knowledge, the blockchain can be
improved with the smart contract [26], DAC (Distributed
Autonomous Corporation), sharding technique and D2D
communication, and flexibly applied into the feature extrac-
tion method in [25] to solve these problems [27]. To be
able to execute calculations and deal with the above prob-
lems, we propose a consortium blockchain-based outsourc-
ing feature extraction method over encrypted images (called
CB-SIFT).
Themain contributions of the CB-SIFT scheme are demon-
strated as follows:
• Safety. Consensus among communities ensures the reli-
ability of image features with keeping feature effects
in SIFT, and the features and smart contract are stored
in blockchain, which solve the privacy leaking problem
of image features (e.g. tempering, forging by the semi-
trusted clouds).
• Wide application ranges. Feature extraction informa-
tion of clouds is published on the blockchain network in
the form of DACs’ (servers) pre-set rules. The users find
the matching DACs by filtering on the Internet, which
enables wider application ranges and less communica-
tion costs.
• High efficiency. With the sharding technique, different
communities of servers can concurrently perform the
feature extraction for different images to improve the
approach efficiency. Besides, the D2D communication
are applied into the consortium chain to enhance the
communication efficiency among the servers and reduce
the communication costs.
• Less storage pressure. We specialize the bolckheader
contents so that each server only needs to store the block-
header chain [28], and a few of blocks to alleviate the
storage pressure as well as keep the blockchain integrity.
II. PRELIMINARIES
Before describing our design, we first introduce the
blockchain and other related techniques (e.g. smart contract,
DAC, sharding technique and D2D communication).
A. BLOCKCHAIN
The blockchain [29]–[31] is a distributed ledger, which is
maintained by the network nodes through competitive com-
puting based on the consensus mechanism [32]. There are no
centralizedmanagement organizations, and the data exchange
is verified by the digital signature technology. Besides, each
tamper-resistant transaction in the blockchain is cryptograph-
ically linked to two adjacent blocks.
The blockchain is divided into the public chain, consor-
tium chain and private chain by the network decentralization
degree. It is worth noticing that the consortium chain targets
on a certain group, and a plurality of preselected nodes are
designated as consensus nodes. To comply better perfor-
mance [33], it has certain requirements for the configuration
and network environment of the consensus nodes.
B. SMART CONTRACT
The smart contract is a computer protocol designed to dis-
seminate, validate, or execute contracts in an information-
based manner, and it allows trusted trading without the third
parties. The smart contract automatically operates once the
pre-set conditions are triggered. For example, whether the
users have paid for enough money, does the extracted image
feature meet the criteria, is the feature extraction fulfilled
within the allocated time. The purpose of smart contract is to
provide a better security approach than the traditional contract
and to reduce other trading costs associated with it.
C. DAC
The DAC has enough CPU (Central Processing Unit), mem-
ory and an IP (Internet Protocol) address. It automatically
operates without human intervention, and manages itself
through a series of open and fair rules (e.g. the money costs,
feature effects, time costs, and reward mechanism for the
DAC shareholders and its running) which appear in the form
of open source software. The DAC shareholders acquire
shares [34] by purchasing shares or providing services, and
they are able to share the organization’s revenue and par-
ticipate in the system operation. Bitcoin and other virtual
currencies are typical DACs. Each bitcoin participant can
share the benefits of bitcoin growth, and the global bitcoin
community is open to anyone. The self-regulation rules of the
DAC are explained as follows:
• Participants of the DAC system are its self-automation
units.
• The units are trustless, and they only consider their own
interests in the DAC system.
• The self-government units will not influence each other
if they do not trust each other.
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FIGURE 2. The system model.
D. SHARDING TECHNIQUE
The sharding technique can be used to enhance the
blockchain’s scalability [35] and efficiency. The network
nodes are demanded to save the discriminated blocks state
and manage diverse transactions in the blockchain system.
The nodes are usually assigned to different communities, and
the handling process of the transactions are carried out in a
parallel way among the communities, which greatly improves
the system efficiency.
E. D2D COMMUNICATION
D2D communication technology refers to a communica-
tion method in which two peer nodes communicate directly.
Firstly, user’s data is directly transmitted between the termi-
nals, which avoids its transmission in the cellular commu-
nication through the network transfers, thereby generating
the link gain. Secondly, resources between the D2D users
and the D2D cells can be restored. Therefore, the resource
multiplexing gain can be generated. Finally, the link gain and
the resource multiplexing gain can improve the efficiency
of the wireless spectrum resources, thereby improving the
network throughput.
After the techniques related to the CB-SIFT scheme are
explained, we elaborate the problem formulation of CB-SIFT
scheme in the next section.
III. PROBLEM FORMULATION
In this section, we demonstrate the problem formulation of
our design including the system model, system overview
and designing goals, and the detailed constructions will be
provided in the next section.
A. SYSTEM MODEL
As the system model presented in the FIGURE 2, the user
trades with the cloud for feature extraction of encrypted
images, and the complete process includes four stages:
(1) The user looks for the clouds meeting his requirements;
(2) the user uploads the encrypted images to the cloud after
both of the user and cloud catch an agreement;
FIGURE 3. The operation process of the CB-SIFT scheme.
TABLE 1. Notations in the CB-SIFT scheme.
(3) the cloud servers carry out the feature extraction method
to obtain the encrypted image features;
(4) and the cloud returns the feature results to the user and
the user decrypts them to gain the final image features.
We improve the stages (1), (2) and (3) by applying the
DAC, sharding technique, D2D communication and smart
contract into the blockchian to construct a widely applied,
highly efficient and more secure CB-SIFT scheme. In addi-
tion, to alleviate storage pressure of the servers and abandon
the useless information, we specially designate the blcok-
header contents such that the integrity of feature data can
be guaranteed by storing the blockheader chain and some
number of blocks.
B. SYSTEM OVERVIEW
We outline the CB-SIFT method which is shown in the
FIGURE 3 in this section. TABLE 1 describes the notation
definitions in the CB-SIFT scheme, and note that the servers
serve as nodes in the consortium chain of our design. Taking
the blocks Bj and Bj+1 as an example, the CB-SIFT scheme
is demonstrated as follows:
• Consortium chain filtering. The servers act as DACs to
issue their feature-related information on the blockchain
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network, and users search for the appropriate DACs
online.
• Transmitting the encrypted images. After the two
sides agree on the deal, they create a smart contract and
publish it into the blockchain. The consensus servers
(S im(i = 1, 2)(m = 1, . . . ,M )) in the consortium
chain are randomly divided into different communities
with two servers in each community. O divides each
encrypted image into two sections I1m and I
2
m, and they
are transmitted to the consortium chain at once. Each
server among the communities is responsible for the
feature extraction of certain encrypted image section
with the relationship I im←→ S im.
• Feature consensus. S im executes the feature extraction
for I im using the method in [25]. The V
1
m and V
2
m are
separately recorded by Ac chosen through the PoW
(Proof-of-Work) [36] consensus mechanism among all
communities, and together with the calculation values
are sent to the certain servers in other communities for
verification with the correspondence S im ↔ S im(m =
1, . . . ,m − 1,m + 1, . . . ,M ). With the related values,
S1m(m = 1, . . . ,m − 1,m + 1, . . . ,M ) and S2m(m =
1, . . . ,m− 1,m+ 1, . . . ,M ) cooperatively perform the
feature extraction process as S im(i = 1, 2) to verify V im,
and notice that V ivm(i = 1, 2) is recorded by Ac.
• Feature conforming. Ac sends the recorded V ivm(i =
1, 2) to O, and O decrypts V 1vm and V
2
vm to get V
m.
If the feature effects and spent time related to Vm meet
the conditions in the smart contract, the smart con-
tract is triggered. Then V¯ ivm(i = 1, 2) which contains
the descriptors of main direction in V ivm(i = 1, 2),
the related parameters and smart contract are written into
the blockheaders of Bj and Bj+1. The V 1vm and V 2vm are
separately written into the blockbodies of Bj and Bj+1
by Ac. Each sever saves the blockheader chain and some
blocks. Besides, the servers will be rewarded with the
pre-set rules in the DACs.
C. DESIGNING GOAL
The ultimate goal of this work is to design a secure
and tamper-resistant, widely applied, efficient and trustless
privacy-preserving outsourcing image feature extraction sys-
tem. To this end, we have the following specific designing
goals.
• Security and tamper-resistance constraint: Apart
from the image contents preserving, the processed and
stored image feature data should be prevented from
tampering by the cloud servers.
• Application constraint: The users should easily and
quickly find the outsourcing clouds and the servers can
serve for more users without incurring much communi-
cation overhead.
• Efficiency constraint: The feature extraction and con-
tract signing should have less time overhead. Moreover,
the communication efficiency among the servers should
be as high as possible, and less communication costs
should be spent.
• Trust constraint: There are no need for trust between
the users and servers, and among the servers.
IV. THE CB-SIFT SCHEME: OUR SYSTEM CONSTRUCTION
Based on the feature extraction method in [25], we construct
the CB-SIFT scheme by using the smart contract, DAC and
sharding technique, which has the same notation definitions.
Before presenting the concrete construction of CB-SIFT
scheme, we first review the outsourcing feature extraction
method in [25].
A. OUTSOURCING FEATURE EXTRACTION METHOD IN [25]
The SIFT is a computer vision algorithm used to detect and
describe the local features in images. It searches for extreme
points in different spatial scales, and extracts their positions,
scales and rotation invariants. Based on the SIFT which is
integrated with the SHE and SIMD, Hu et al. proposed an
approach to realize the feature extraction by two severs over
an encrypted outsourcing image. The two servers handle the
different parts of an image, and co-work with the related cal-
culations and numerical comparisons during feature extrac-
tion through the BSMP and BSCP.
The execution steps of the approach in [25] are described
as follows:
• Image encryption. O generates a random matrix
I2m(x, y) and obtains I
1
m(x, y) by encrypting Im(x, y)
through the formula I1m(x, y) = Im(x, y) + I2m(x, y).
I1m(x, y) and I
2
m(x, y) are separately sent to S
1
m and S
2
m.
• Keypoint localization. Let the symbol σ be the scale
in the scale space. By the formulas L i(x, y, σ ) =
G(x, y, σ ) ∗ I im(x, y) and Di(x, y, σ ) = (G(x, y, kσ ) −
G(x, y, σ )) ∗ I im(x, y), Gaussian scale space (LoG) and
Difference-of-Gaussian scale space (DoG) of the image
are described. Each sample point in DoG is compared
with its 26 neighbors by the BSCP to find the local
extreme points, and their edge responses are eliminated
by computingH im(x, y, σ ), and comparingDet
1
m(x, y, σ )
and Det2m(x, y, σ ) with the BSMP and BSCP. Finally,
the stable extreme points Pism are gained.
• Orientation assignment. L i(x, y) is the scale space
value of the keypoint. Through the formulas (1) and
(2), the servers collect mim(x, y) and 2
i
m(x, y) of pix-
els which are distribute in 3σ neighborhood window
around the keypoint (1) and (2), as shown at the bottom
of the next page. The histogram Him is used to count
mim(x, y) and2
i
m(x, y) of the Gaussian-smoothed pixels.
Him divides the 0◦ − 360◦ direction range into 36 bins,
and each bin is 10◦. Implementing the BSCP on the
accumulated gradient magnitudes among all bins inH1m
and H2m, the highest peak is found, which acts as the
main direction of the keypoint. The directions within the
80% of the highest peak are the auxiliary directions of
the keypoint, and can also be found through the BSCP.
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FIGURE 4. The operation principles of DACs.
At this point, the information(x, y,2) about the keypoint
position, scale, and direction is owned.
• Descriptor generation. S im generates the descriptor for
each keypoint. The neighboring area in LoG of the
keypoint is divided into 4 × 4 sub-areas, and each one
serves as a seed point. The sub-area size is the same
condition as the keypoint orientation assignment, that
is, 3σ sub-pixels. S im generates a gradient histogram in
each sub-area which has 8 directions and is weighted by
the same Gaussian window, and calculates the gradient
magnitude eventually accumulated in each direction.
Finally, the 4 × 4 × 8 = 128 gradients information is
gained to be compressed into V im of the keypoint.
• Image feature obtaining. V im is transmitted to O who
computes the final image feature by the formula Vm =
V 1m − V 2m.
B. CB-SIFT SCHEME
This section elaborates the details of the CB-SIFT scheme,
and it contains four main processes: consortium chain fil-
tering, transmitting the encrypted images, feature consensus,
and feature conforming.
1) CONSORTIUM CHAIN FILTERING
FIGURE 4 describes the operation principles of DACs. The
consensus servers within the consortium chain collectively
share and invest in the DACs whose rules are same and
distributed on these stakeholders in the form of open source
software. The DACs are owned by nobody and no one can
modify their rules once the rules are set by their owners,
only if the majority of stakeholders reached a consensus.
The entire blockchain network comprised of the consortium
chains and users is distributed, and the pre-outsourcing stage
FIGURE 5. The user’s filtering process for the DAC.
in the system only involves the preparation works of both the
users and consortium chains. FIGURE 5 describes the user’s
filtering process for the DAC, and the working mode of the
DAC and filtering mode of the user include the following two
aspects:
• For one thing, the DACs issue their feature extraction
information on the blockchain network. More specifi-
cally, they public the information about price, feature
extraction effects and time for an image feature extrac-
tion.
• For another thing, the users can search for the proper
DACs on the Internet, and compare them to select
the most satisfying one. Alternatively, the user can get
the specific DAC through inputting the filtering crite-
ria for feature extraction. Eventually, it outsources its
encrypted images to the required DAC.
2) TRANSMITTING THE ENCRYPTED IMAGES
FIGURE 6 depicts the working status of smart contract.
After O selects the appropriate DAC and both sides reach
an agreement on the deal, they will create a smart contract,
and the consortium chain contained the DAC starts working.
Besides, the details of severs (i.e. capability, reputation, etc.)
and legal provisions are listed on the smart contact. The
conditions of the smart contract include: whether the smart
contract receives enough money from O, whether the effects
of extracted feature meet the user’s standards, and whether
the servers have completed the feature extraction within the
allocated time Tcb. In addition, the smart contract will be
published into the blockchain.
FIGURE 7 shows the sharding technique in our design.
According to the sharding technique, S im in the consortium
chain is randomly divided into different communities con-
taining two servers by the function F(S im) = Cm(i =
1, 2)(m = 1, . . . ,M ) before the image transmission, and the
images are managed and concurrently executed for feature
mim(x, y) =
√
(L i(x+1, y)− L i(x − 1, y))2+(L i(x, y+1)− L i(x, y− 1))2. (1)
2im(x, y) = tan−1((L i(x + 1, y)− L i(x − 1, y))/(L i(x, y+ 1)− L i(x, y− 1))). (2)
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FIGURE 6. The working status of smart contract.
FIGURE 7. The sharding technique in the CB-SIFT approach.
extraction by different communities. For ∀S im, F(S im) satisfies
the following properties:
• Given S11 , S21 , . . . , S1m, S2m, . . . , S1M , S2M , and C1, . . . ,
Cm, . . . ,CM denotes range.
• F(S im) = Cm is a bijection from two servers to one
community.
• Inputting ∀S im, F(S im) randomly outputs a value Cm that
has nothing to do with the S im.
The encrypted images are sent to the consortium chain
only if the money paid for the cloud fulfils the conditions in
the smart contract and it is triggered. O produces a random
I2m(x, y) for each image, and it encrypts Im(x, y) through the
function I1m(x, y) = Im(x, y) + I2m(x, y). The encrypted and
divided image sections I im(x, y) are transmitted to the consor-
tium chain at once, where S im(m = 1, . . . ,M ) within the same
community cooperates with each other to extract feature for
its according section with the matching S1m ↔ I1m(x, y) and
S2m ↔ I2m(x, y)(m = 1, . . . ,M ).
3) FEATURE CONSENSUS
The section involves three stages for feature consensus:
the accounter selection, feature extraction and feature
verification. We exemplify the executing process of the com-
munity Cm.
At the first stage, the servers in the consortium chain com-
pete for the accounter selection through the PoWmechanism.
• Confirming the difficulty and target.The difficulty deter-
mines the required times of hash operation performed
by a node to generate a legal nonce, and much lower
difficulty than the bitcoin blockchain is adopted in the
CB-SIFTmethod because there are only a few consensus
servers in the consortium chain and the computing is
limited. In addition, a target is needed for the PoW
mechanism, and the PoW target of bitcoin blockchain
is calculated as follows:
Target = max{Target}
Difficulty
. (3)
• Nonce calculation. The core idea of the PoW consensus
mechanism is to ensure the data consistency and con-
sensus security by introducing the computing compe-
tition among distributed nodes. Each server competes
with each other based on their respective computing to
solve a complex and easy-to-verify SHA256 mathemat-
ics, which is presented in the formula below:
SHA256(SHA256(version+ HS j−1 + HS j + timestamp
+Difficulty+ nonce)) ≤ Target. (4)
• Accounter determination. The fastest server calculating
the legal nonce get the block accounting rights and is the
Ac, and it accounts for V im(m = 1, . . . ,M ).
The feature extraction process is initiated in this stage.
S im in Cm cooperatively extracts feature of I
i
m, and the course
is concurrently performed among different communities. S im
executes the following steps to fulfill the feature extraction
on I im for obtaining V
i
m:
• Keypoint location. The preliminary exploration of the
keypoints is accomplished by comparing the two adja-
cent layers in DoG within the same octave. To find the
extreme points in DoG, each pixel is compared with
its 26 neighbors. S1m and S
2
m cooperatively compare two
values with the BSCP. For Picm, S
i
m calculates the main
curvature H im of P
i
cm by the BSCP and BSMP to elimi-
nate the edge response and select out Pism.
• Orientation assignment. In order to use the image’s local
feature to assign a reference direction for each keypoint
in Pism, S
i
m counts the contributions made by the pixels
around the keypoint to its directions. The scale value σ
of the keypoint is obtained after its precise positioning
in the previous step. Then the Gaussian image closest to
σ can be calculated by the formula below:
L i(Pism(x, y)) = G(Pism(x, y, σ )) ∗ I im(Pism(x, y). (5)
L i(Pism(x, y)) is the keypoint value in LoG. The image
gradient method is used to find the stable direc-
tions of the local structure. For Pism(x, y) detected in
DoG, the gradient magnitude and direction distribution
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mim(x, y) and 2
i
m(x, y) of the pixels in the 3σ field
around it are calculated with the formulas (1) and (2).
Then with mim(x, y) and 2
i
m(x, y) weighted by the same
Gaussian window, S im builds Him where 0◦ − 360◦ is
divided into 36 bins. The horizontal axis of Him is the
direction angle of gradient, and the vertical axis is the
cumulative value of the gradient magnitude during the
orientation angle. The highest peak HPim and local peak
within 80% of the highest peak LHPim in Him can be
determined by continuously using the BSCP between
two bins.
• Descriptor generation. There are three pieces of infor-
mation for each keypoint so far: location, scale, and
direction. This step is to create a descriptor for each
keypoint and use a vector to describe it. The descrip-
tor is a representation of the statistical results for the
Gaussian image gradient in the neighborhood of each
keypoint, and S im performs three steps to obtain it. S
i
m
first determines the image area required to calculate the
descriptor. The area is divided into 4 × 4 subareas and
each one is used as a seed point with 8 directions, ie,
its histogram of the gradient direction divides 0◦− 360◦
into 8 direction intervals. S im then rotates the coordinate
axis to the direction of the keypoint to ensure the rotation
invariance. Finally, S im splits the rotated area into 4 × 4
subregions and calculates their gradient histograms. The
V im with 4 × 4 × 8 = 128 dimensions is acquired to be
the keypoint descriptor.
In addition, S im(m = 1, . . . ,m−1,m+1, . . . ,M ) performs
the same steps as S im to get V
i
m(m = 1, . . . ,m − 1,m +
1, . . . ,M ), and V im(i = 1, 2)(m = 1, . . . ,M ) are separately
recorded by Ac.
Next, Ac sends the recorded V im respectively to S
i
m(m =
1, . . . ,m − 1,m + 1, . . . ,M ) for verification, and the same
verification operations are applied for V im(m = 1, . . . ,m −
1,m+ 1, . . . ,M ).
• Transmitting the feature data. S1m sends its image data
and computation related data VDim = (I1m,H1m,Det1m,
P1cm,P
1
sm,m
1
m,2
1
m,Nb
1
m,HP
1
m,LHP
1
m), and Ac sends the
recorded V 1m to S
1
1 , . . . , S
1
m−1, S1m+1, . . . , S1M , which are
the same as S2m.
• Verifying the feature vector. Once receiving the feature
data from S im and Ac, S
i
m(m = 1, . . . ,m − 1,m +
1, . . . ,M ) performs the same steps in the feature extrac-
tion stage to check V im.
• Accounting for the valid feature vector. S im(m =
1, . . . ,m−1,m+1, . . . ,M ) sends the signed V im which
is valid to the entire network. If V 1m and V
2
m receive all
the signatures of S im(m = 1, . . . ,m− 1,m+ 1, . . . ,M ),
they are indicated valid and finally recorded by Ac.
S im(m = 1, . . . ,m − 1,m + 1, . . . ,M ) performs the same
steps as S im to get V
i
m(m = 1, . . . ,m − 1,m + 1, . . . ,M )
verified, only the V ivm(i = 1, 2)(m = 1, . . . ,m − 1,m +
1, . . . ,M ) can be recorded by Ac.
4) FEATURE CONFORMING
This section includes the feature recovering and blocks build-
ing. We use Vm and Bj as an example, and it is the same steps
for Vm(m = 1, . . . ,m− 1,m+ 1, . . . ,M ) and block Bj+1.
• Feature recovering. The recorded V ivm(i = 1, 2) is sent
to O by Ac. O decrypts V ivm(i = 1, 2) to recover the final
image feature Vm according to the formula (6):
Vm = V 1vm − V 2vm. (6)
Besides, Vm(m = 1, . . . ,m − 1,m + 1, . . . ,M ) is
recovered through the same steps.
• Blocks building. The conditions whether the effects of
Vm meet the user’s standards and whether the consor-
tium chain have completed the image feature extrac-
tion within the time Tcb are checked once the Vm is
decrypted. The smart contract is triggered as long as
the two conditions fulfil the requirements in the DACs,
and the checking results are also returned to O. Once
the smart contract run automatically, the hashed V 1vm
is written into the blockbody of Bj by Ac. In addition,
we extract the elements corresponding to the main direc-
tion’s descriptors from V 1vm to form V¯
1
vm, which is stored
in the blockheader of Bj together with the parameters
HS j−1, HS j, version number, difficulty, timestamp and
the smart contract. Unlike the traditional blockchain,
since it is not necessary for each server to store the
complete V 1vm, the blockheader is specialized so that
each server only needs to store the block headerchain
and B¯ blocks, which eases each server of its storage
pressure. It is the same operation to complete the stor-
ages of V 1vm(m = 1, . . . ,m − 1,m + 1, . . . ,M ) and
V¯ 1vm(m = 1, . . . ,M ). Furthermore, V 1vm(m = 1, . . . ,M )
and V¯ 1vm(m = 1, . . . ,M ) are separately stored in the
blockbodies and blockheaders of Bj in the order of m =
1, . . . ,M .
Besides, the blockBj+1 is established through the similar
steps. At this point, Bj and Bj+1 are generated.
S im will be rewarded according to the pre-determined rules
in the DACs after the above stages are completed. FIGURE
8 describes a case study to demonstrate the entire process of
the CB-SIFT scheme.
V. SYSTEM PRACTICALITY AND PERFORMANCE
To be able to construct a practical and well performed fea-
ture extraction approach for outsourcing encrypted images,
we have to carefully analyze several characteristics of our
design including the method practicality in terms of effec-
tiveness and security, and the method performance in terms
of efficiency and storage pressure.
A. PRACTICALITY
In this section, we prove that the CB-SIFT scheme is practical
through the proofs of effectiveness and security.
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FIGURE 8. A case study of the CB-SIFT scheme.
1) EFFECTIVENESS
The effectiveness is deemed reached as long as the feature
effects in our design are closest to the outputs in the original
SIFT. In the CB-SIFT scheme, the effectiveness of feature
effects is determined by the effectiveness of feature consensus
which includes the accounter selection, feature extraction
and feature verification.
Proposition 1 (The Effectiveness of Accounter Selection):
The accounter selection in the CB-SIFT scheme is effective.
Proof: The accounter selection is realized by the com-
puting competition based on the PoW mechnism which is
a mature and widely applied consensus mechanism. Thus,
the accounter selection process is effective.
Proposition 2 (The Effectiveness of Feature Extraction): In
the CB-SIFT scheme, the feature extraction realized by the
method in [25] is effective.
Proof: The feature extraction process in the CB-SIFT
scheme is complied based on the feature extraction method
in [25], which keeps the same feature effects as SIFT and has
been examined effective.
Proposition 3 (The Effectiveness of Feature Verification):
For ∀S im(i ∈ {1, 2},m ∈ {1, . . . ,M}), if V im is not tampered
by S im, it will be checked valid by all S
i
m(m = 1, . . . ,m −
1,m + 1, . . . ,M ) and agreed to be the V ivm. If not, ∃S im(i ∈
{1, 2},m ∈ {1, . . . ,M}) who tampers with V im, then it will
not be agreed by at least one S im(i ∈ {1, 2},m ∈ {1, . . . ,m−
1,m+ 1, . . . ,M}), and there is no V ivm generated for it.
Proof: The effectiveness of feature verification is mainly
decided by the stage of verifying the feature vector. Assume
that Cm(m = 1, . . . ,m − 1,m + 1, . . . ,M ) concurrently
verifies V im, that is, S
i
m(m = 1, . . . ,m − 1,m + 1, . . . ,M )
performs the same steps in feature extraction to verify the
validity of V im withholding the same VD
i
m as the otherM − 2
servers (S i1 ↔ · · · ↔ S im−1 ↔ S im+1 ↔ · · · ↔ S iM ). We use
C1 as an example to prove the verification effectiveness of V im
from three related processes.
• Verification of located keypoint. S i1 examines Pism, Picm,{Picm} − {Pism} and the sample pixels orderly. S i1 first
compares the size of Pism with its 26 neighbors by the
BSCP, and it continues to execute the same operations to
Picm if P
i
sm is indeed larger or smaller. If the calibration
of Picm passes, {Picm}−{Pism} is singled out to be testified
for its edge response.Withholding the values ofH im(x, y)
andDet im(x, y) (actually the correlation values for calcu-
latingH im(x, y) andDet
i
m(x, y) by the BSCP and BSMP),
S i1 determines whether {Picm} − {Pism} is possessed with
the edge response according to the ratio γ in the formula
(7). In the formulas (7) and (8), Tr(H im) is the trace
of H im, α and β respectively denote the maximum and
minimum eigenvalues of H im. {Picm} − {Pism} is unstable
when γ is greater than the threshold (usually γ = 10).
Tr(H im(x, y))
2
Det im(x, y)
= (α + β)
2
α · β =
(γ + 1)2
γ
. (7)
Where
H im(x, y) =
(
Dxx(x, y) Dxy(x, y)
Dyx(x, y) Dyy(x, y)
)
;
Tr(H im) = Dxx(x, y)+ Dyy(x, y) = α + β;
Det(H im) = Dxx(x, y)Dyy(x, y)− (Dyy(x, y))2
= α · β;
γ = α
β
. (8)
The sample pixels are examined through the same oper-
ations, and Pism is valid if all examinations pass.
• Verification of assigning orientation. For the valid Pism,
S i1 further validates its HP
i
m and LHP
i
m. S
i
1 uses the
data mim(x, y),2
i
m(x, y),Nb
i
m in VD
i
m to draw Him, and
testifies the authenticity of HPim and LHP
i
m in Him by
the BSCP. The Pism whose HP
i
m and LHP
i
m are valid will
be further validated.
• Verification of generated descriptor. Each element in V im
of the finally valid Pism is calibrated, and V
i
m is valid by
C1 when all its elements are verified pass.
At the same time, C2, . . . ,Cm−1,Cm+1, . . . ,CM verifies
V im by the three processes, and V
i
m is finally effective only
if all the verifications by Cm(m = 1, . . . ,M ) are passed.
Therefore, for ∀V im, if it has been tampered, the verification
of V im will not be passed in any part. In summary, the feature
verification is effective.
Therefore, the same feature effects as SIFT are reached in
the CB-SIFT scheme, and the CB-SIFT scheme is certified
effective.
2) SECURITY
The security of outsourcing images contains the privacy of
image pixels and features. Although the confidentiality of
image pixels is guaranteed in [25], there are still security risks
on the image features, which mainly exists in two processes:
the feature extraction and storage about the following situa-
tions.
• Feature extraction. The cooperated servers may jointly
tamper with the feature data.
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• Feature storage. The attackers may try to obtain or tam-
per with the stored image features.
We prove that the CB-SIFT scheme solves these security
issues from three small aspects.
For the security of feature extraction:
• Security of feature consensus. Feature extraction exists
in the stage of feature consensus of the CB-SIFT
scheme. Therefore, to keep the security of feature extrac-
tion, we require to certify the security of the complete
feature consensus stage. Apart from the security of
accounter selection, the extracted image features need
to be verified by S im(m = 1, . . . ,M ), which prevents S1m
and S2m from jointly tampering with V
i
m.
For the security of feature storage:
• Security of block data. Features are stored in the blocks
of the blockchain. The encrypted features are hashed
and written into the blocks Bj and Bj+1. Besides, Bj+1
is connected with the previous block Bj through HS j,
which can keep the block data secure.
• Security of feature co-storage. Different from the tradi-
tional blockchain, each server in the CB-SIFT method
only saves the blockheader chain and B¯ blocks, which
can keep the blockchain integrity and security.
Proposition 4 (Security of Feature Consensus): On the one
hand, the CB-SIFT scheme keeps the security of accounter
chosen through the PoW consensus mechanism; on the other
hand, the feature verification process is secure, and only the
valid V im is conformed to be V
i
vm.
Proof: The security of feature consensus includes the
security of accounter selection, feature extraction and feature
verification.
For the security of accounter selection, the PoW mecha-
nism is a mature consensus algorithm and is widely applied,
thus its security about selecting the accounter will not be
described again. The security of feature extraction is deter-
mined by both the feature extraction and feature verification.
As proven in the proposition 3, the verification process is
valid. For example, for ∀V im, if it is tampered during the
feature extraction process, it will not be finally approved by
all servers. Therefore, security of both the feature extraction
and feature verification can be assured.
Proposition 5 (Security of Block Data): The block data
containing ¯V 2vm,V 2vm,HS j,HS j+1, version number, difficulty,
timestamp, and smart contract are secure after they are hashed
and written into block Bj+1 of the blockchain.
Proof: The CB-SIFT method hashes ¯V 2vm and V 2vm on the
basis of the encrypted images, and saves them in the block
Bj+1. In addition, for Bj+1 itself, it is always connected with
Bj by HS j. Therefore, the block data is secure according to
the tamper-resistant property of the blockchain.
Proposition 6 (Security of Feature Co-Storage): Let
whp, |Bsum| and Shonm respectively represent the malicious
servers, the total number of blocks and the honest servers, and
suppose that |whp| = ε · 2M ≤ 13 · 2M . For the given |Bsum|,∃|B0| ∈ N+, when B¯ ≥ |B0|, it is safe for each server to
store B¯ blocks and the blockheader chain, and the blockchain
integrity can be assured.
Proof: In the CB-SIFT scheme, each server stores the
blockheader chain. Analogous to the traditional blockchain,
it is secure for each server to store the blockchain. Therefore,
the blockheader chin in the system is secure. To keep the
system secure, the safety of B¯ blocks must be guaranteed.
The total number of blocks saved by whp is 2M · ε · B¯(0 <
ε ≤ 13 ), and blocks by Shonm is [2M − 2M · ε] · B¯.
Consider the most terrible case where whp jointly tampers
with their common block Bw. There would be |(Bw)whp| =
2M · ε copies of Bw saved by whp. To keep the blockchain
secutiry, Bw saved by Shonm must fulfill the following circum-
stance:
|(Bw)hon| > 2M · ε. (9)
From the formula (9), there is
min{|(Bw)hon|} = 2M · ε + 1. (10)
Then the total number of blocks stored by ShonM fulfills
6hon = (2M · ε + 1) · |Bsum|. (11)
To keep the blockchain integrity, we let ShonM evenly save the
blocks, and each one saves |(B)hon| blocks:
|(B)hon| = 6hon
2M − 2M · ε =
(2M · ε + 1) · |Bsum|
2M · (1− ε) . (12)
Let B¯ = |(B)hon| = (2M ·ε+1)·|Bsum|2M ·(1−ε) , and the storage security
and blockchain integrity are proved.
At this point, we theoretically certify that the CB-SIFT
scheme is practical in terms of effectiveness and security. The
next section certifies its performance in terms of efficiency
and storage pressure.
B. PERFORMANCE
In this section, we prove that the CB-SIFT scheme is well per-
formed through the proofs of efficiency and storage pressure.
1) EFFICIENCY
The efficiency means the time costs for image feature
extraction. This section analyzes the available efficiency of
the CB-SIFT scheme, which is mainly determined by the
efficiency of feature consensus including the accounter
selection, feature extraction and feature verification.
Proposition 7 (Efficiency of the CB-SIFT Scheme): The
CB-SIFT scheme is highly efficient in image feature extrac-
tion, and it is almost M times of that in method [25].
Proof: We prove the efficiency of feature consensus
from three aspects:
• Accounter selection. During the feature consensus stage
of the CB-SIFT scheme construction, quite low diffi-
culty is adopted in the CB-SIFT method according to
the determination rules for the value of difficulty, that is,
the smaller the computing, the lower the difficulty. The
accounter selection time is mainly decided by the time to
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count the legal nonce. Assume that the time required for
calculating the legal nonce is at least Tas in the CB-SIFT
scheme, and the total time for feature consensus is Tfc,
therefore, Tas  Tfc.
• Feature extraction. Assume that the time required for an
image feature extraction is T in the method [25] and Tfe
in the CB-SIFT method, and Tfe satisfies:
Tfe = TM . (13)
• Feature verification. The total time for feature verifica-
tion contains the time for transmitting the feature data,
verifying the feature vector and accounting for the valid
feature vector, where the time used to account for the
valid feature vector is mainly spent in data transmission.
During the processes of transmitting the feature data and
accounting for the valid feature vector, Ac and S im send
V im and VD
i
m to S
i
m(m = 1, . . . ,m − 1,m + 1, . . . ,M ),
and S1m, . . . , S
m−1
m , S
m+1
m , . . . , S
M
m separately sends the
verification results to S im. Let the Tft1 and Tft2 be the time
separately wasted during the two processes in the CB-
SIFT scheme, and Tft be the time that it takes to perform
the two processes for one image, and it satisfies:
Tft = Tft1M + Tft2. (14)
Since the data transmission occurs among the consensus
servers within the same consortium chain which has cer-
tain requirements for the configuration and the network
environment of the consensus nodes, and is deployed in
the D2D network, therefore, Tft  Tcb.
S im performs the same steps as the feature extraction dur-
ing the feature verification process. Differently, the data
H im(x, y),Det
i
m(x, y), m
i
m(x, y),2
i
m(x, y) and Nb
i
m, and
the values I im,P
i
cm,P
i
sm,HP
i
m,LHP
i
m and V
i
vm are known
by S im, therefore, the execution speed in the verification
process is much faster than that in the feature extraction.
Assume that it requires the time Tfv for validating an
image by all communities, then it satisfies Tfv  Tfe.
Let TMfv be the time for validating features ofM images,
and it satisfies:
TMfv = (M − 1) · T ′fv ≤ (M − 1) · Tfv.
Tfv =
(M − 1) · T ′fv
M
≤ M − 1
TMfv
.
Tcb ≈ Tfc = Tas + Tfe + Tft + Tfv
= Tas + TM +
Tft1
M
+ Tft2 +
(M − 1) · T ′fv
M
≈ T
M
+ Tft1
M
+ Tft2 +
(M − 1) · T ′fv
M
≤ T
M
+ Tft1
M
+ Tft2 + (M − 1) · TfvM
≈ T
M
. (15)
At this point, the proposition has been proved.
TABLE 2. Items saved by each server of our design and the bitcoin
blockchain.
2) STORAGE PRESSURE
Storage pressure is determined by the space needed for
each server to store the blockchain. Different from the tradi-
tional blockchain (e.g. bitcoin blockchain) where the whole
blockchian is stored by each node, we re-design the block-
header to make each server only save the blockheader chain
and B¯ blocks. This section analyzes and compares the storage
pressure of each server in the conditions of our design and the
bitcoin blockchain.
Proposition 8 (Storage Pressure of Each Server): The
servers in the blockchain system of the CB-SIFT scheme have
less storage pressure than those in the bitcoin blockchain.
Proof: We specify all storage items of blocks saved by
each server in the conditions of our design and the bitcoin
blockchain.
• In the CB-SIFT method, items in the blockheader
(Bhead )cb include V¯ 2vm, (HS
j)cb, (HS j+1)cb, the version
number Vercb, difficulty (D)cb, timestamp T cb, and
smart contract (SC)cb. Items in the blockbody (Bbody)cb
include the number of images (K )cb and V 2vm.
• In the bitcoin blockchain, items in the blockheader
(Bhead )b include (HS j)b, (HS j+1)b, the version number
Verb, difficulty (D)b, timestamp T b, and smart contract
(SC)b. Items in the blockbody (Bbody)cb include the
number of images (K )b and V 2vm.
In the bitcoin blockchain, each server saves the
blockchain which includes all (Bhead )b and (Bbody)b. How-
ever, the blockchain system of CB-SIFT scheme requires
each server to save B¯ different blocks and the blockheader
chain including all (Bhead )sr . From the formula (12), the B¯
blocks occupies pretty small storage in the blockchain, then
the B¯ blocks can be ignored compared with the blockheader
chain and the blockchain. TABLE 2 shows the items saved
by each server of our design and the bitcoin blockchain.
LetV1, . . . ,V9 be the volumes of the items above. From the
TABLE 2, the items V¯ 2vm and V
2
vm are the only different items
between our design and the bitcoin blockchain. However,
V¯ 2vm only contains just a few elements in V
2
vm, therefore,
V¯ 2vm · |Bsum| < V 2vm · |Bsum|. Thus, the proposition is proved.
In summary, based on the theoretical analysis, the CB-SIFT
scheme is conformed to be effective, secure, high efficient
and small of storage pressure. We experimental evaluate the
characteristics in the next section.
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VI. EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION
The experimental evaluation incudes the evaluations in terms
of the effectiveness of feature consensus, efficiency and stor-
age pressure.
• Effectiveness. The effectiveness of feature consensus
including the accounter selection, feature extraction and
feature verification. A detailed experimental implemen-
tation of the effectiveness about feature extraction has
been carried out in [25]. The accounter selection and
feature verification are actually the execution process
of the PoW consensus mechanism. According to the
property of the PoW consensus mechanism to assure the
data consistency and consensus security, the consistency
of the feature extracted through the feature extraction
methodin [25] can be self-insured by the PoW consensus
mechanism, that is, the effectiveness of feature effects
can be kept. Thus, we would not evaluate the effective-
ness experimentally.
• Efficiency. Efficiency refers to the time costs used for
image feature extraction and it is mainly determined
by the time spent during the feature consensus process
of the CB-SIFT scheme. We empirically evaluate the
efficiency of the CB-SIFT method by the total time
costs spent during the three stages of feature consensus:
the accounter selection, feature extraction and feature
verification.
• Storage pressure. Besides, we experimentally measure
the storage situation of each server within the consor-
tium chain, and compare it with the bitcoin blockchian.
Our procedure is designed with JAVA, and we implement
all components of the CB-SIFT scheme on the procedure and
the consortium chain on the popular hyperledger fabric [37]
with the computer attribute of Intel(R)core(TM) i5-4590CPU
@ 3.30GHZ and RAM:8GB. The goals of our evaluation are
twofold.We first measure the time costs for feature consensus
in the CB-SIFT scheme when the image size increases, and
compare it with the method [25]. The second goal is to mea-
sure and compare the storage size of each server in the sys-
tem of CB-SIFT scheme and bitcoin blockchain. We aim to
establish that the efficiency and storage overhead of the CB-
SIFT scheme matches its theoretical analysis in Section of
PERFORMANCE.
A. EFFICIENCY EVALUATION
Experimental setup. We run several experiments with dif-
ferent number of the communities in the consortium chain
and different size of the images to measure the time costs for
feature consensus in the CB-SIFT scheme, and compare it
with the scheme in [25]. We vary the number of communities
from 2 to 4, and the size of images from 40 ∗ 40 to 200 ∗ 200.
Time costs for feature consensus. The results show that
the time costs for feature consensus in the CB-SIFT scheme
is much less than those in [25], and it almost decreases in
multiples with the growing number of communities, which
agrees with the theoretical analysis. The experimental results
are plotted in FIGURE 9.
FIGURE 9. The time costs for feature consensus in the CB-SIFT scheme.
FIGURE 9 describes the time costs for an image feature
consensus under the conditions of the scheme [25], and 2 and
4 communities in the CB-SIFT method respectively with the
image pixels increasing by 40∗40, 80∗80, 120∗120, 160∗160
and 200 ∗ 200. With the same size of images, the time costs
in [25] is rather longer than those in the CB-SIFTmethodwith
2 and 4 communities, and the time costs is almostM times of
those in the CB-SIFT approach, which satisfies the theoretical
analysis. According to the FIGURE 9, for the image size
of 200 ∗ 200, the scheme [25] spends respectively 70.4 and
100.768 minutes more than the time costs of the CB-SIFT
method with 2 and 4 communities. Besides, with the image
size growing, the time costs in the CB-SIFT method with
2 and 4 communities slightly change, and the more number
of communities, the less time for feature consensus.
Besides, with the experimental results, the Eq. 15 could
be further validated. Take the condition with the image size of
200∗200 and the number of communities of 4 as an example,
and there are:
Tas = 10.64s
Tfe = 1761.6s
Tft = 63.035s
Tfv = 25.655s (16)
With the value in Eq. 17, there is:
Tcb ≈ Tfc = Tas + Tfe + Tft + Tfv
= 10.64s+ 1761.6s+ 63.035s+ 25.655s
= 1860.96s (17)
B. STORAGE PRESSURE EVALUATION
Experimental setup.Different from the tradition blockchain
(e.g. bitcoin blockchain), each server saves the blockheader
chain and some blocks in the CB-SIFT approach. Suppose
that the image size is 400 ∗ 400, we show how the CB-SIFT
approach outperforms the bitcoin blockchain in ameliorat-
ing the storage pressure of each server with the length of
blockchain changes from 1000 to 1000000.
Storage size. The experimental results in FIGURE
10 show that the storage size of each server in the CB-SIFT
scheme is small and much less needed than that in the bitcoin
blockchain, which agrees with the theoretical analysis.
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FIGURE 10. The stotrage size of each server in the CB-SIFT algorithm.
FIGURE10 describes the storage size needed by each
server to store the block data under the conditions of the
bitcoin and the CB-SIFT method when the blockchain length
is growing from 1000, 10000, 100000 to 1000000. The
results show that the required storage size in the bitcoin
blockchain grows rather faster and is much larger than that
in the system of CB-SIFT method. With the same length
of the blockchain, the occupied space of each server in the
bitcoin blockchain is about 2 to 5 times of that in the system
of CB-SIFT method. The experiments show that when the
length of blockchain is 100 0000, the occupied space of each
server is 545.0563MB in our system, however, 1516.6411MB
in the bitcoin blockchain, which is about 1000MB larger. The
experimental results meet the theoretical analysis.
In summary, our experiments confirm the theoretically
expected efficiency and storage pressure in the CB-SIFT
scheme.
VII. CONCLUSION
The consortium chain-based outsourcing feature extraction
over encrypted image provides further security, application
ranges, efficiency and less storage pressure compared with
the existing schemes. The CB-SIFT algorithm is based on
the blockchain with the PoW consensus mechanism, and is
implemented with the existing smart contract, DAC, shard-
ing technique and D2D as well as a specially self-designed
blockheader. The image feature is reached for consensus
through the blockchain classical PoW mechanism; and the
smart contract is also introduced into the blockchain, which
strengthens security of the CB-SIFT scheme with preserving
the advantages in the existing methods. The DAC plays a
big role in widening the application ranges between the users
and clouds. Most importantly, the sharding technique greatly
enhances efficiency of the CB-SIFT scheme. Furthermore,
the re-designated blockheader is in favor of alleviating the
servers’ storage burden. We also implement the detailed
theoretical analysis and experimental evaluation to conform
the practicality in terms of effectiveness and security, and
performance in terms of efficiency and storage pressure of
our design, which verifies the advantages realized in the
CB-SIFT approach.
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